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 This is a revised and considerably more focussed version of ASSRU DP 3-2010. This could be 
considered a report of an ongoing research project on ‘freedom in research and teaching in academic 
environments’. The aim is to study the evolution of the debates in the foundations of mathematics — 
metamathematics — and nonlinear dynamics in the past century and a quarter and try to learn lessons 
about the way these subjects have influenced the mathematization of economics - for good and bad.  
My indebtedness to fellow ASSRU members, Kao Selda and V. Ragupathy, goes far beyond the usual 
expression of gratitude. It is easy to substantiate my feeling that this paper owes its existence, in this 
form, as much to their work and advice as to my own attempts. On the other hand the remaining 









In this paper I attempt to make a case for promoting the courage of rebels within the 
citadels of orthodoxy in academic research environments. Wicksell in Macroeconomics, 
Brouwer in the Foundations of Mathematics, Turing in Computability Theory, Sraffa in the 
Theories  of  Value  and  Distribution  are,  in  my  own  fields  of  research,  paradigmatic 
examples of rebels, adventurers and non-conformists of the highest caliber in scientific 
research  within  University  environments.  In  what  sense,  and  how,  can  such  rebels, 
adventurers  and  non-conformists  be  fostered  in  the  current  University  research 
environment dominated by the cult of ‘picking winners’? This is the motivational question 
lying behind the historical outlines of the work of Brouwer, Hilbert, Bishop, Veronese, 
Gödel, Turing and Sraffa that I describe in this paper. The debate between freedom in 
research  and  teaching,  and  the  naked  imposition  of  ‘correct’  thinking,  on  potential 
dissenters of the mind, is of serious concern in this age of austerity of material facilities. It 
is a debate that has occupied some of the finest minds working at the deepest levels of 
foundational issues in mathematics, metamathematics and economic theory. By making 
some  of  the  issues  explicit,  I  hope  it  is  possible  to  encourage  dissenters  to  remain 
courageous in the face of current dogmas. 
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   2 
Introduction 
 
"You have not converted a man because  you have silenced 
him." 
Viscount Morley: On Compromise, 1874 
 
Brouwer was silenced by Hilbert
1, but refused to be converted from 
Intuitionism; Bishop was silenced, but continued his courageous task of 
refounding  much  of  classical  mathematics  on  constructive  grounds; 
Wicksell was repeatedly thwarted from a permanent academic post, but 
did  not  turn  away  from  voicing  his  rebellious  opinions  on  every 
available platform; Sraffa's rigorous—yet elegant—prose was silenced, 
and  distorted,  by  mindless  mathematical  economists,  yet  he  was  not 
converted,  even  though  he  remained  (largely)  silent  in  the  face  of 
repeated  misrepresentations  of  his  economics  and  his  mathematics; 
Dirac's delta function was silenced by von Neumann, in the name of 
mathematical  rigour,  yet  did  not  succeed  in  preventing  its  ultimate 
success,  exactly  on  the  grounds  of  mathematical  rigour;  Veronese's 
valiant  attempt  to  develop  a  non-Archimedean  theory  of  the 
infinitesimal was silenced by his great contemporary, Giuseppe Peano, 
supporting Cantor and supported by Russell, yet—half-a-century later - 
it was Veronese who was vindicated. 
The examples can be multiplied and enriched with episodes of 
silencing dissenters from many fields of research and learning. 
In every case, orthodoxy and conformism triumphed - albeit in 
the short-run; the visionaries triumphed, eventually, mostly after their 
time,  but  not  always.  The  hallmark  of  each  example  of  orthodoxy's 
apostles silencing heretics was the unbending, unflinching, conviction 
with which the official heretics held their visions, and  refused to be 
converted, even if their temporary silences may have been construed as 
conversions. 
What does it take to hold on to a vision? In the absence of 
institutional support, the only way of sustaining an unorthodox vision is 
to have the courage to remain the ‘unrewarded amateurish conscience’ 
of  the  intellectual  world,  in  the  sense  made  wonderfully  clear  by 
                                                            
1 As noted by van Dalen, in his superbly fair and detailed outline of the ‘The Crisis of the 
Mathematische Annalen’, when Hilbert resorted to  every possible means− both fair and 
foul − to remove Brouwer from its editorial board, (van Dalen, 1990, p. 31): 
"After the Annalen affair, little zest for the propagation of intuitionism was left in Brouwer; 
... Actually, his whole mathematical activity became rather marginal for a prolonged 
period."   3 
Edward  Said  in  his  Fourth  BBC-Sponsored  Reith  Lecture  (The 
Independent, 15 July, 1993): 
 
"Every intellectual has an audience and a constituency. The 
issue  is  whether  that  audience  is  there  to  be  satisfied,  and 
hence a client to be kept happy, or whether it is there to be 
challenged,  and  hence  stirred  into  outright  opposition,  or 
mobilised into greater democratic participation in the society. 
But in either case, there is no getting around the intellectuals 
relationship  to  them.  How  does  the  intellectual  address 
authority: as a professional supplicant, or as its unrewarded, 
amateurish conscience?" 
 
Brouwer and Bishop, Veronese and Levi-Civitta, Wicksell and 
Sraffa, Gödel and Turing, Dirac and Feynman, had the courage to be 
‘authority's  unrewarded,  amateurish  conscience’  (till,  orthodoxy 
embraced the vision of the heretics and made it part of a new orthodoxy, 
to  be  confronted  by  new  heretics  -  and  the  cycle  repeated  itself 
endlessly). It is this that we need to make clear to the young, idealistic, 
enquiring,  fresh  minds  that  enter  our  Universities  with  hopes  and 
expectations of unbiased education, intellectual adventure and a path 
towards  the  frontiers  of  research,  without  too  many  compromises  to 
authority—of whatever form. 
With these aims in mind the paper is structured as follows. In 
the next section, a kind of succinct statement of the credo I want to 
subscribe to, is outlined. 
The paper's main focus, however, is to discuss, via, the way a 
particular vision of the foundations, and the practice of, mathematics 
was  systematically  subverted  on  non-scientific  grounds,  the  way  an 
orthodoxy in any one epoch tried to act as censorious Commissars on 
what is right and what is proper in mathematical activity; but also to go 
beyond  and  do  their  utmost  to  banish  anything  that  smacked  of  an 
alternative  vision  –  usually  by  appealing  to  undefined  notions  of 
‘rigour’, but not always. Every kind of pressure was brought to bear on 
alternative visions and to subvert them and make it impossible for the 
alternative  visionaries  to  get  a  hearing  via  the  ordinary  channels  of 
communication. These issues are discussed in sections 3. Section 4 is a 
simple story of the kind of unintended consequences of free thinking 
that could undermine even the most meticulously devised systems of 
foresight. The concluding section summarizes the lessons in the form of 
speculative reflections.   4 
A Setting 
 
If you can look into the seeds of time, 
And say which grain will grow and which will not, 
Speak then to me, who neither beg nor fear 
Your favors nor your hate.  
 
Macbeth, Act I, Sc. III 
 
Intellectual  history  is  replete  with  claims  of  complete  solutions, 
definitive codifications, unambiguous ‘final’ resolutions of paradoxes, 
almost all and every one of which have turned out to be illusory. I want 
to state three such examples, just to place the idea of eternal vigilance 
against  this  dogma  of  ‘final  solutions’,  but  also  to  suggest  that 
visionaries  with  conviction  should  persevere,  even  against  the  most 
formidable odds,  particularly  in  intellectual  contexts.  Their  time  will 
come, perhaps too late for them to savour, but posterity has a way of 
resurrecting vintage ideas, rather like the way great wines mature with 
grace and evolve into silken tastes. 
In the context of the issues treated in this paper, a significant 
example  is  the  obituary  of  the  ‘paradoxes’  of  the  infinitesimals,  the 
infinite  and  the  continuum,  announced  by  no  less  an  authority  than 
Bertrand Russell, (Ehrilch, 2006), pp. 1-2 (bold emphasis, added): 
 
"In his paper Recent Work On The Principles of Mathematics, 
which  appeared  in 1901,  Bertrand  Russell  reported  that  the 
three  central  problems  of  traditional  mathematical 
philosophy—the  nature  of  the  infinite,  the  nature  of  the 
infinitesimal, and the nature of the continuum—had all been 
‘completely solved’ . ... Indeed, as Russell went on to add: 
‘The solutions, for those acquainted with mathematics, are so 
clear as to leave no longer the slightest doubt or difficulty’ ... . 
According  to  Russell,  the  structure  of  the  infinite  and  the 
continuum  were  completely  revealed  by  Cantor  and 
Dedekind, and the concept of an infinitesimal had been found 
to  be  incoherent  and  was  ‘banish[ed]  from  mathematics’ 
through the work of Weierstrass and others
2” 
                                                            
2 In Russell (1937),  p. 337 (italics added), he is equally merciless in dismissing any role 
for the infinitesimal in mathematics (not just in mathematical philosophy): 
   5 
Excommunications,  intolerant  arrogance,  are  some  phrases 
that come to mind, when reading these premature obituaries. Why do 
even  advocates  of  liberal,  tolerant,  attitudes  to  public  life  become 
intolerant in the purely intellectual domain? 
My  two  other  examples  refer  to  equally  celebrated  but, 
mercifully, even more immediately falsified prophetic pontifications by 
two almost saintly intellectual giants of the 19th century: Lord Kelvin 
and John Stuart Mill. The former is reputed to have suggested, on the 
eve of the works by Planck and Einstein that changed the intellectual 
map of the natural scientist, that all the problems of physics had been 
solved : except for just two anomalies: that of the Michelson-Morley 
experiment and Black Body radiation! The one led to the relativistic 
revolution; the other to the quantum intellectual cataclysms
3 
As for the great and saintly John Stuart Mill, in what can only 
be called an unfortunate moment of weakness, he etched for posterity 
these (in)-famously un-prophetic thoughts on the ‘end of the theory of 
value’, (Mill, 1848, Bk. III, Ch. I., p. 266); italics added: 
 
"Happily, there is nothing in the laws of Value which remains 
for the present writer to clear up; the theory of the subject is 
complete:  the  only  difficulty  to  be  overcome  is  that  of  so 
stating  it  as  to  solve  by  anticipation  the  chief  perplexities 
which occur in applying it: and to do this, some minuteness of 
exposition, and considerable demands on the patience of the 
reader, are inevitable”. 
 
These words were coined on the eve of Marx's great and revolutionary 
works and not many years before the even more significant marginal 
revolutions in value theory. 
                                                                                                               
"[W]e may, I think, conclude that these infinitesimals are mathematical 
fictions." 
 
Now, a little over a century after Russell's initial obituaries, the infinitesimal, the infinite 
and the continuum are very much alive, well and even routinely applied in economics, too! 
Most of the frontier mathematical models in macroeconomic theory are based on variables 
defined on the continuum; or, it is claimed that the most rigorous way to model a 
competitive economy, with price taking behaviour, should be on the basis of non-standard 
analysis." 
 
3 The actual statement, made in an address to an assemblage of physicists at the British 
Association for the advancement of Science in 1900, seems to have been: "There is 
nothing new to be discovered in physics now. All that remains is more and more precise 
measurement."   6 
An example of particular relevance for the theme and content 
of this paper may highlight the problem. The article that initiated, and 
even  provided  the  encapsulating  name  for,  the  Grundlagenkrise  in 
mathematics,  during  the  decade  of  the  1920s,  was  Hermann  Weyl's 
classic: "Über die neue Grundlagenkrise der Mathematik”(Weyl, 1921). 
This was not published in the leading Mathematical Journal—at least in 
Continental  Europe—of  the  time,  Mathematische  Annalen  (MA),  in 
spite of the fact that Weyl was, at that time, still very close to Hilbert, 
the main editor of MA. Hesseling, in his admirably exhaustive study of 
the Grundlagenkrise conjectures, I think correctly, ‘that Weyl wanted to 
speak  freely’  (Hesseling,  2003,  p. 132).  Naturally,  this  conjecture,  if 
correct,  presupposes  that  Hilbert  would  have  acted  as  a  censoring 
Commissar,  and  not  as  an  impartial  editor,  contrary  to  Felix  Klein's 
original  aims  for  the  Mathematische  Annalen  to  be  an  outlet  for 
alternative views and visions of Mathematics and its foundations. 
In many and precisely documentable ways, it will not be an 
exaggeration to say that Weyl's unexpected conversion to a version of 
intuitionism and constructive mathematics—especially in his advocacy 
of  impredicativism—set  the  stage  for  the  initiation  of  the 
Grundlagenkrise  of  the  1920s.  Even  more  than  Brouwer's  own 
fundamental contributions, it may have been Weyl's famous book on 
Das Kontinuum (Weyl, 1918), and his two subsequent articles, (Weyl, 
1919; 1921), that set the tone and themes, at least in the first instance, 
for the Grundlagenkrise. If not anything else, at least the two phrases 
that became common currency in the debates, were coined by Weyl in 
the above book and articles: Der circulus vitiosus and Grundlagenkrise. 
Essentially, ‘Weyl wanted to speak freely’, but may have feared that 
‘Hilbert would have wanted him to speak correctly’, and chose—since 
he  could  -  the  former  alternative.  How  many  young  researchers,  in 
today's environment, are straitjacketed and frog-marched into ‘speaking 
correctly’, by being forced to collect brownie points for publishing in 
officially rated Journals, than thinking freely and expressing fresh and 
original  thoughts,  unencumbered  by  the  shackles  of  orthodoxy's 
censorious  Commissars,  who  hide  behind  the  mantra  of  ‘peer 
reviewing’? 
 
Towards the Grundlagenkrise 
 
"It  may  be  remarked  here  that  Hilbert  was  too  pessimistic 
about  a  Tertium  non  datur-free  mathematics.  Work  in  the 
intuitionistic school and above all the results of the school of   7 
Errett  Bishop  gave  a  powerful  impetus  to  constructive 
mathematics by actually rebuilding large parts of analysis in a 
constructive manner." 
(van Dalen, 2005, p. 576); italics added. 
 
There have been many foundational crises in mathematics, but the one I 
refer to here as the Grundlagenkrise is that which was associated almost 
exclusively with the debate surrounding the positions taken by the two 
protagonists for two foundational views on Mathematics: Hilbert and 
Brouwer, and which blossomed, and then wilted in acrimony, of the 
most  unexpectedly  personal  sort,  during  the  whole  of  the  1920s, 
reaching a kind of climax in 1928. As mentioned above, it may have 
said to have crystallized and been initiated by the explicit stance taken 
by Weyl, and stated clearly in his three foundational works between 
1918—1921.  Weyl's  stance  was  somewhere  in  between  the  pure 
intuitionism of Brouwer and the finitist formalism of Hilbert, although 
much closer in philosophical adherence to the former than the latter. 
Weyl's intuitionism was closer in spirit to Poincaré’s impredicativism. 
Both Brouwer and Bishop, separated by forty years between 
the beginning of the end of the Grundlagenkrise in October 1928 and 
the  publication  of  Bishop's  classic  Foundations  of  Constructive 
Analysis, (Bishop, 1967) suffered remarkably similar fates: the orthodox 
mathematician's  indiscriminate  victimization  of  alternative  visions  of 
the  foundations of  mathematics.  This  was partly  due  to  the way  the 
mathematicians misunderstood—or simply were ignorant of—the way 
Brouwer and Bishop tried to develop an intuitive mathematics, entirely 
consistent with the practice of the applied mathematician, without any 
reliance on, or appeal to, mathematical logic. Theirs was a fate and a 
drama that was reenacting that which was played at the turn of the 19
th 
century, into the 20th, between Cantor and Veronese, with Peano firmly 
on Cantor's side, on the way infinitesimals were to be considered in the 
foundations  of  the  real  number  system  and  on  non-Archimedean 
systems, in general. Ostensibly, Cantor won the intellectual battle, but 
only ‘temporarily’; Veronese was vindicated, more than half-a-century 
later,  after  a  rejuvenated  research  into  non-standard  analysis  in  a 




"I admire the elegance of [a] proof of existence; but I still do 
not think that for my purpose I needed it. Existence, from my   8 
point of view, was a part of the hypothesis; I was asking, if 
such a system existed, how would it work?" 
(Hicks, 1983, p.375), (italics added). 
 
Unfortunately,  the  beginning  of  the  end  of  the  Grundlagenkrise 
coincided almost exactly with the re-birth of mathematical economics, 
in a precise, and precisely datable, sense. The von Neumann paper of 
1928  (von  Neumann,  1928),  introduced,  and  etched  indelibly,  to  an 
unsuspecting  and  essentially  non-existent  Mathematical  Economics 
community  and  tradition  what  has  eventually  come  to  be  called 
‘Hilbert's  Dogma’  (van  Dalen,  2005  pp.  576-7),  ‘consistency   
existence’.  This  became—and  largely  remains—the  mathematical 
economist's credo. Hence, too, the inevitable schizophrenia of ‘proving’ 
existence of equilibria, first, and looking for methods to construct them 
at a second, entirely unconnected, stage. Thus, too, the indiscriminate 
appeals to the  tertium non datur—and its implications—in ‘existence 
proofs’,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  ignorance  about  the  nature  and 
foundations of constructive mathematics, on the other. 
But it was not as if von Neumann was not aware of Brouwer's 
opposition to ‘Hilbert's Dogma’, even at that early stage, although there 
is reason to suspect—given the kind of theme I am trying to develop in 
this paper—that something peculiarly ‘subversive’ was going on. Hugo 
Steinhaus(1965) observed, with considerable perplexity: 
 
"[My]  inability  [to  prove  the  minimax  theorem]  was  a 
consequence of the ignorance of Zermelo's paper in spite of its 
having been published in 1913. .... J von Neumann was aware 
of the importance of the minimax principle [in (von Neumann, 
1928)]; it is, however, difficult to understand the absence of a 
quotation of Zermelo's lecture in his publications." 
ibid, p. 460; italics added 
 
Why  didn't  von  Neumann  refer,  in  1928,  to  the  Zermelo-
tradition  of  (alternating)  games?  van  Dalen,  in  his  comprehensive, 
eminently readable, scrupulously fair and technically and conceptually 
thoroughly competent biography of Brouwer, van Dalen (2000, p. 636), 
noted (italics added), without additional comment that
4 
                                                            
4 At the end of his paper Euwe reports that von Neumann brought to his attention the works 
by Zermelo and Konig, after he had completed his own work (ibid, p. 641). Euwe then 
goes on (italics added):   9 
"In  1929  there  was  another  publication  in  the  intuitionistic 
tradition:  an  intuitionistic  analysis  of  the  game  of  chess  by 
Max Euwe (Euwe, 1929). It was a paper in which the game 
was viewed as a spread (i.e., a tree with the various positions 
as nodes). Euwe carried out precise constructive estimates of 
various classes of games, and considered the influence of the 
rules for draws. When he wrote his paper he was not aware of 
the  earlier  literature  of  Zermelo  and  Dénès  König.  Von 
Neumann called his attention to these papers, and in a letter 
to Browuer von Neumann sketched a classical approach to the 
mathematics  of  chess,  pointing  out  that  it  could  easily  be 
constructivized." 
 
Why didn't von Neumann provide this ‘easily constructivized’ 
approach—then, or later? Perhaps it was easier to derive propositions 
appealing to the tertium non datur, and to ‘Hilbert's Dogma’, than to do 
the hard work of constructing estimates of an algorithmic solution, as 
Euwe did? Perhaps it was easier to continue using the axiom of choice 
than  to  construct  new  axioms—say  the  axiom  of  determinacy—as 
Steinhaus  and  Mycielski  (1964)  did?  Whatever  the  reason,  the  fact 
remains that the von Neumann legacy was indisputably a legitimization 
of  ‘Hilbert's Dogma’ and the indiscriminate use of the axiom of choice 
in mathematical economics. 
Unfortunately,  core  areas  of  mathematical  economics  and 
game theory, with impeccable orthodox sanction, are replete with false 
claims  and  assertions  about  constructivity,  intuitionism  and 
computability.  It  is  ‘even  worse’  in  the  citadel  of  mathematical 
economic theory for the following reason: what is called computable 
general equilibrium theory (CGE) forms the foundational core of one 
frontier of macroeconomic theory: Recursive Competitive Equilibrium 
(RCE)  which,  in  turn,  forms  the  basis  for  the  Stochastic  Dynamic 
General  Equilibrium  (SDGE)  model.  The  claim  in  these  parts  of 
mathematical economics is that CGE is computable—as is evident even 
from the appellation ‘computable’ in CGE—because it is constructive 
(in the sense of Brouwer). 
But this claim is false. And it is ‘even worse’ because these 
claims are made in the context of economic policy models and are used 
                                                                                                               
"Der gegebene Beweis is aber nicht konstruktive, d.h. es wird keine Methode angezeigt, 
mit Hilfe deren der gewinnweg, wenn überhaupt möglich, in endlicher Zeit konstruiert 
werden kann."   10 
to justify the derivations of policy propositions, with the accompanying 
claims  that  they  are  computationally  feasible  with  any  prespecified 
numerical  accuracy.  Even  in  respectable  graduate  mathematical 
economic  and  game  theoretic  textbooks,  there  are  claims  about 
constructible algorithms and constructive proofs that are blatantly false. 
A  perceptive  reader  would  also  notice  the  schizophrenia 
exhibited  between  ‘proving  existence’  and  ‘computing  it’—i.e., 
separating  the  existence  problem  from  that  of  a  construction.  Thus, 
without  batting  an  eyelid,  these  two  advocates  of  the  schizophrenia 
could  state  that  ‘it  is  essential  to  know  that  an  equilibrium  exists.... 
before attempting to compute that equilibrium.’ It never seems to have 
occurred to them that this separation is precisely the one that is avoided 
in constructive mathematics. 
Why does orthodoxy get away with such impunity? Why are 
obvious falsehoods allowed to persist and perpetuate themselves, quite 
apart  from  distorting  alternative  methodologies,  especially 
mathematically rigorous ones? 
Before I try to forge conjectural answers for these queries, I 
would like to return to Brouwer and Bishop—but also to Richard von 
Mises  and  his  valiant  efforts  to  define,  rigorously,  a  notion  of 
probability—and the way various orthodoxies subverted, often by foul 
means  and  disgraceful  methods,  their  noble  efforts  to  challenge  the 
foundations  of  classical  mathematics  (and  probability  theory)  on  the 
basis of impeccably rigorous philosophical, epistemological and, above 




"Hilbert's program .... was driven by dual beliefs. On the one 
had,  Hilbert  believed  that  mathematics  must  be  rooted  in 
human intuition. ... It meant that intuitively bounded thought 
(finitary  though,  he  called  it)  is  trustworthy,  and  that 
mathematical paradox can arise only when we exceed those 
bounds to posit  unintuitable (i.e., infinite) objects. For him, 
finite  arithmetic  and  combinatorics  were  the  paradigm 
intuitable  parts  of  mathematics,  and  thus  numerical 
calculation  was  the  paradigm  of  finitary  thought.  All  the 
rest—set theory, analysis and the like – he called the ‘ideal’ 
part  of  mathematics.  .....  On  the  other  hand,  Hilbert  also 
believed  that  this  ideal  part  was  sacrosanct.  No  part  of 
mathematics was to be jettisoned or even truncated. ‘No one   11 
will  expel  us.’  he  declared,  ‘from  the  paradise  into  which 
Cantor has led us’
5” 
(Carl Posy, 1998, pp. 294-5); italics added 
Summarising  the  tortuous  personal  and  professional  relationship 
between Brouwer and Fraenkel, van Dalen (2000, p. 309) concluded 
that: 
 
"Fraenkel also should be credited for pointing out a curious 
psychological  hypocrisy  of  Hilbert,  who  to  a  large  extent 
adopted  the  methodological  position  of  his  adversary—‘one 
could even call [Hilbert] an intuitionist’ ... Although the inner 
circle  of  experts  in  the  area  ...  had  reached  the  same 
conclusion from time before, it was Fraenkel who put it on 
record." 
 
So, why was there a Grundlagenkrise? Why, in early October, 1928, did 
Hilbert write Brouwer as follows: 
 
"Dear Colleague, 
Because it is not possible for me to cooperate with you, given 
the  incompatibility  of  our  views  on  fundamental  matters,  I 
have asked the members of the board of managing editors of 
the Mathematische Annalen for the authorization, which was 
given to me by Blumenthal and Carathéodory, to inform you 
that henceforth we will forgo your cooperation in the editing 
of the Annalen and thus delete your name form the title page. 
And at the same time I thank you in the name of the editors of 




                                                            
5 The exact quote is as follows, (Hilbert, 1925, p. 191): 
‘No one shall drive us out of the paradise which Cantor has created for us.’ 
 
To which the brilliant ‘Brouwerian’ response, if I may be forgiven for stating it this way, 
by Wittgenstein (1976, p. 103) was: 
 
‘I would say, "I wouldn't dream of trying to drive anyone out of this paradise." 
I would try to do something quite different: I would try to show you that it is 
not a paradise - so that you'll leave of your own accord. I would say, You're 
welcome to this; just look about you." ’ 
   12 
This letter
6, written at the tail end of the  Grundlagenkrise , 
marked  the  beginning  of  the  end  of  it,  and  silenced  Brouwer
7 for a 
decade and a half. Why, if they were both ‘intuitionists’ did Hilbert and 
his ‘Göttinger’ followers, former students and admirers ‘silence’ him in 
this deplorably undemocratic way? Were they afraid of an open debate 
on  the  exact  mathematical  meaning  of  intuitionism  and  constructive 
mathematics?  Did  they  take  the  trouble  to  read  and  understand 
Brouwer's deep and penetrating analysis of mathematical thinking and 
mathematical processes? There is sad, but clear evidence that Hilbert 
never 
took  the  trouble  to  work  through,  seriously,  with  the  kind  of 
foundational  case  Brouwer  was  making;  contrariwise,  Brouwer  took 
immense  pain  and  time  to  read,  work  through  an  understand  the 
foundational stance taken by Hilbert and his followers. 
What  were  the  issues  at  the  centre  of  the  Grundlagenkrise, 
leaving  aside  the  personality  clashes?  As  I  see  it  there  were  three 
foundational issues, on all of which I believe Brouwer was eventually 
vindicated: 
  The  invalidity  of  the  tertium  non  datur  in  infinitary 
mathematical reasoning; 
  The  problem  of  Hilbert's  Dogma  -  i.e.,  ‘existence   
consistency’  vs.  the  constructivist  credo  of  ‘existence  as 
construction’, in precisely specified ways; 
  The problem of the continuum - and, therefore, the eventual 
place  of  Brouwer's  remarkable  introduction  of  choice 
sequences,  whose  time  seems  to  have  come  only  in  recent 
years; 
 
                                                            
6 This battle between the two protagonists in the Grundlagenkrise, Hilbert and Brouwer, 
was referred to as the ‘Frosch-Mäusekrieg’ by Einstein in his letter to Max Born on 27 
November, 1928. Einstein, who was also a member of the editorial board of the 
Mathematische Annalen, did not support Hilbert's unilateral and extraordinary action to 
remove Brouwer from the board.  
7 In van Dalen's poignant description, the once effervescent, immensely productive, and 
active Brouwer (van Dalen, 2005, pp. 636-7): 
"[F]elt deeply insulted and retired from the field. He did not give up his 
mathematics, but he simply became invisible. ... Even worse, he gave up 
publishing for a decade .. . His withdrawal from the debate did not mean a 
capitulation, on the contrary, he was firmly convinced of the soundness and 
correctness of his approach." 
   13 
Carl Posy (1998), reflecting on ‘Brouwer versus Hilbert: 1907—
1928’, from a Kantian point of view (ibid, p. 292) – both Brouwer and 
Hilbert had been deeply influenced by Kant, and Hilbert, after all, grew 
up in Königsberg, which Kant never left!!—summarised the outcome of 
the Grundlagenkrise in an exceptionally clear way, as follows (pp. 292-
3): 
 
"[Hilbert]  won  politically.  Although  a  face-saving  solution  was 
found,  the  dismissal  [from  the  Editorial  Board  of  the 
Mathematische  Annalen]  held.  Indeed,  Brouwer  was  devastated, 
and his active research career effectively came to an end. 
[Hilbert]  won  mathematically.  Classical  mathematics  remains 
intact, intuitionistic mathematics was relegated to the margin. .... 
 
And  [Hilbert]  won  polemically.  Most  importantly...  Hilbert's 
agenda  set  the  context  of  the  controversy  both  at  the  time  and, 
largely, ever since." 
 
Quite apart from whether Hilbert actually ‘won’, at least on the 
third front,—especially in the light of the subsequent quasi-constructive 
and partly-intuitive ‘revolutions’ wrought by recursion theory and non-
standard methods—there is also the question of how he won. 
To suggest a tentative answer to this question, let me ‘fast-forward’ 
forty years, to the trials and tribulations faced by Errett Bishop who re-
constructed  (sic!)  large  parts  of  classical  mathematics,  observing 
constructive discipline on the invalidity of the tertium non datur and 
non-admissibility  of  ‘Hilbert's  Dogma’  in  his  classic  and  much 
acclaimed  Foundations  of  Constructive  Analysis,  (Bishop,  1967), 
Bishop, too, faced similar personal and professional obstacles to those 
that Brouwer and his followers faced—although not to the same degree 
and not from the kind of officially formidable adversary like Hilbert. 
Anil Nerode, George Metakides and Robert Constable summarise the 
sadness with which Bishop, too, felt ‘silenced’, (Nerode et.al, 1985, pp. 
79-80): 
 
"After  the  publication  of  his  book  Constructive 
Analysis  [in  1967],  Bishop  made  a  tour  of  the  eastern 
universities....  .  He  told  me  then  that  he  was  trying  to 
communicate  his  viewpoint  directly  to  the  mathematical 
community,  rather  than  through  the  logicians.  ...  After  the 
eastern  tour  was  over,  he  said  the  trip  may  have  been   14 
counterproductive.  He  felt  that  his  mathematical  audience 
were not taking the work seriously. ....  
After the lecture [at Cornell, during the tour of the 
eastern  universities]  he  mentioned  tribulations  in  the 
reviewing process when he submitted the book for publication. 
He mentioned that one of the referee's reports said explicitly 
that  it  was  a  disservice  to  mathematics  to  contemplate 
publication of this book. He could not understand, and was 
hurt by such a lack of appreciation of his ideas. .... 
In the next dozen years his students and disciples had 
a  hard  time  developing  their  careers.  When  they  submitted 
papers  developing  parts  of  mathematics  constructively,  the 
classically minded referees would look at the theorems, and 
conclude  that  they  already  knew  them.  They  were  quite 
hesitant  to  accept  constructive  proofs  of  known  classical 
results;  whether  or  not  constructive  proofs  were  previously 
available.  .....  Nowadays,  with  the  interest  in  computational 
mathematics, things might be different. Bishop said he ceased 
to take students because of these problems. ... 
When  Bishop  was  invited  to  speak  to  the  AMS 
Summer  Institute  on  Recursion  Theory,  he  replied  that  the 
aggravation caused by the lecture tour a decade earlier had 
contributed to a heart attack, and that he was not willing to 
take a chance on further aggravation." 
 
What is it about the adherence to the tertium non datur and to 
‘Hilbert's  Dogma’  that  makes  a  whole  profession  so  intolerant?  But 
obviously it is not only here that intolerance resides. Equally dogmatic, 
intolerant, voices were raised against Giuseppe Veronse's, admittedly 
somewhat less ‘rigorous’ - at least in comparison with the works of 
Brouwer  and  Bishop—pioneering  work  on  the  non-Archimedean 
continuum. In particular, Veronese's great Italian contemporary, Peano, 
mercilessly  –  and  as  intolerantly  as  Hilbert  was  against  Brouwer—
criticised and dismissed this work on the non-Archimedean continuum. 
Gordon  Fisher (1994), in his masterly summary of  ‘Veronese's Non-
Archimedean  Linear  Continuum’,  while  acknowledging  the  ‘tortured 
and ungrammatical style’ of the writing (of a massive book of no less 
than 630 pages, Veronese (1891), noted that Peano's review of 1892 
(Peano, 1892) was ‘especially scathing’ (ibid, p. 127). Detlef Laugwitz, 
who  did  much  to  revive  non-standard  analysis,  described  the  ‘open 
controversy that blazed up’, in 1890, ‘when Veronese announced his   15 
use  in  geometry  of  infinitely  large  and  small  quantities’,  (Laugwitz, 
2002, p. 102). When the German translation of the 1891 Italian edition 
appeared in 1894: 
 
"Cantor was doubly irritated. There was another approach to 
infinitely  large  integers;  and,  moreover,  Veronese  re-
established the infinitely small which Cantor believed to have 
proved contradictory."  
(ibid, pp. 102-3); italics added. 
 
A massive two decade-long campaign against what has since 
become the eminently respectable field of non-standard analysis was 
launched  by  many  of  the  mighty  scholars  of  the  foundations  of 
mathematics: Cantor, of course; but, as mentioned above, also Peano 
and Russell. 
Finally, in this genre of intolerant pontifications—that is the 
only way I can now describe these so-called foundational criticisms – 
there is also a sad place to be accorded to the systematic dismissal of 
Richard von Mises's valiant attempts to axiomatise the foundations of 
probability on frequency theoretic grounds using his highly innovative 
idea  of  a  place  selection  function  to  define  what  he  called  a 
‘Kollektive’. A galaxy of ‘eminent’ mathematicians, led by people like 
Fréchet and Knopp (who also played a part on Hilbert's side, against 
Brouwer,  in  the    Grundlagenkrise),  met  in  Geneva,  in  1937,  (van 
Lambalagen,  1987),  and  dismissed  off  hand  the  von  Mises  theory, 
especially in the light of Kolmogorov's measure-theoretic axomatization 
of  probability.  Ironically,  von  Mises  was  strongly  influenced  by 
Brouwer's development of choice sequences in providing content for the 
intuitive  continuum,  when  he  came  to  try  to  formalise  the  idea  of 
‘lawlike selections’. 
It  is  a  particular  irony  of  history  that  the  very  same 
Kolmogorov  –  together  with  Martin-Löf,  Chaitin  and  Solomonof—
revived  to  a  splendid  research  frontier  the  idea  of  algorithmic 
probability and, in that process, also resurrected to a new vigour and life 
the frequency approach to the foundations of probability (Kolmogorov, 
1963). But this is a story that became possible only after computability 
theory  came  into  being—as  a  result  of  the  death-knell  struck  on 
Hilbert's  Program, by  Gödel,  Church,  Turing  and  Post.  Hilbert  may 
have won a battle ‘politically, mathematically and polemically’; but he 
lost his soul—philosophically and epistemologically. 
It is a sad commentary on the Grundlagenkrise to realise that:   16 
 
"It  is  very  likely  that  Hilbert  never  read  Brouwer's  basic 
papers  ...  .  All of  Hilbert's  attacks  at  Brouwer  consisted  of 
rather  superficial  comments  on  hearsay  bits  of  Brouwer's 
repertoire.  Brouwer,  on  the  other  hand,  repeatedly  put  his 
finger  on  the  crucial  spots  of  Hilbert's  programme;  (1) 
consistency  of  induction  requires  induction  ....  ,  (2) 
consistency does not prove existence." 
van Dalen, 2005, p. 637. 
 
Much the same can be said of the experiences faced by Bishop and von 
Mises. 
 
Towards Computability Theory 
 
"The  Proustian  equation  is  never  simple.  The  unknown, 




In 1925 and 1927 Hilbert had begun to crystallise his program 
for the foundations of mathematics in a system which came to be called 
Formalism,  in  contrast  to,  and  in  response  to,  Brouwer's  sustained 
development  of  Intuitionism  as  an  alternative  foundation  for  pure 
mathematics
8. 
Partly as a result of the so-called antinomies of set theory - one 
of the most celebrated of which was Russell's paradox of the  ‘set of all 
sets that do not contain themselves as members’—mathematicians at the 
turn of the 19th century to the 20th had begun to be more circumspect 
of  arbitrary  definitions  and  untrammelled  methods  of  proof.  Hilbert, 
notwithstanding the known antinomies and the dangers of unconstrained 
methods  of  proof,  particularly  in  proving  the  existence  of  a 
mathematical  object  as  a  consequence  of  not  being  able  to  derive  a 
contradiction in the defining criteria i.e., ‘Hilbert's Dogma’ had seemed 
to  promote  the  idea  of  mathematical  formalism  as  a  symbol 
manipulation game, with its own rules without any discipline on the 
                                                            
8 Logicism, the third of the tiresome trilogy, was a foundational system that was the 
outcome of the message of the program to reduce mathematics to logic, represented in the 
three-volume work by Russell and Whitehead. Brouwer, in contrast, was determined, via 
Intuitionism, to free mathematics from logic (and language)   17 
nature,  contents  and  structure  of  thought.  This  is  the  popular  view, 
although it is largely inaccurate. 
Brouwer, at a kind of polar opposite end was convinced, in 
developing the foundations of mathematics on the basis of intuitionism, 
that mathematical objects were the autonomous creations of the human 
mind,  and  endeavoured  to  discipline  the  allowable  techniques  of 
demonstrating  the  existence  of  mathematical  objects  and  their 
definitions  in  ways  that  respected  the  architecture,  philosophy  and 
epistemology of the mind. In this sense there was a direct link to what 
came to emerge as recursion theory, but that is not a story I can expand 
upon at this point. 
The demonstration of the existence of a mathematical object - 
say even an abstract one such as the equilibrium price configuration of 
an  economy,  the  prices  at  which  market  supply  equals  market 
demand—should be  accomplished  by  constructive  methods of proof; 
i.e., methods that could, in principle, be used by an ‘engineer’ actually 
to construct such an object with ruler, compass, chisel, lathe and so on. 
Thus,  to  say  that  a  mathematical  object  exists  if  the  decimal 
representation  of    say,  contains  a  particular  sequence  of  9's  at  a 
particular  place  in  the  expansion,  is  to  say  nothing.  Thus,  for  the 
formalist  mathematician  to  claim  that  even  if  s/he  does  not  know 
whether such a statement is true of the object , God will know, is an 
equally  vacuous  assertion..  This  kind  of  metaphysical  answer  would 
bring forth the retorts from Brouwer that he did not have a pipeline to 
God and if God had mathematics to do, he can do it himself; man's 
mathematics was not necessarily that of God's. In other words, Brouwer 
and the Intuitionists would restrict the allowable methods of proof for 
mathematicians to those that did not appeal to untrammelled infinities, 
undecidable  disjunctions  and  so  on—almost  banning  magic  and 
metaphysics from mathematical practice. Strange, then, that Brouwer 
himself was accused of ‘psychologism’ for his belief in the autonomy of 
the mind and the constructions of the mind of an ideal mathematician, 
especially in the context of his work on choice sequences to provide 
foundations for the intuitive continuum. 
To  these  Brouwerian  objections  and  constructions,  Hilbert 
(would) reply: ‘With your [Brouwer's] methods, most of the results of 
modern  mathematics  would  have  to  be  abandoned,  and  to  me  the 
important thing is not to get fewer results but to get more results.’ But 
why? And at what cost? 
By  the  time  of  the  Bologna  meetings  of  the  International 
Congress of Mathematicians, Hilbert had given two lectures: the first,   18 
titled: On the Infinite, was delivered in Münster on 4 June, 1925 at a 
meeting organised by the Westphalen Mathematical Society to honour 
the memory of Karl Weierstrass, the quintessential formalist; the second 
was titled: The Foundations of Mathematics and delivered in July 1927 
at the Hamburg Mathematical Seminar. They formed the building block 
towards a final crystallization of his position, such that when formulated 
as challenges to mathematicians in the form of well-posed problems, 
and  answers  given,  debate  would  forever  be  silenced  and 
mathematicians would be allowed to go on with their normal activities, 
untrammelled by any kind of constraints by a thought-police of any sort, 
however  enlightened  in  method,  epistemology  or  philosophy.  Hilbert 
had stated his credo, not only by his outstanding mathematical works as 
examples  of  the  philosophy  he  was  advocating—as,  indeed,  was  the 
case  with  Brouwer—but  also  by  explicitly  stating  in  his  influential 
address  to  the  Paris  International  Congress  of  Mathematicians  in 
August,  1900,  titled  famously  and  simply:  Mathematical  Problems 
(Hilbert, 1900, p.444, italics in the original): 
 
[T]he  conviction  (which  every  mathematician  shares,  but 
which  no  one  has  as  yet  supported  by  a  proof)  that  every 
definite mathematical problem must necessarily be susceptible 
of an exact settlement, either in the form of an actual answer 
to the question asked, or by the proof of the impossibility of its 
solution and therewith the necessity failure of all attempts. .... 
Is this axiom of the solvability of every problem a 
peculiarity characteristic of mathematical thought alone, or is 
it possibly a general law inherent in the nature of the mind, 
that all questions which it asks must be answerable? For in 
other sciences also one meets old problems which have been 
settled  in  a  manner  most  satisfactory  and  most  useful  to 
science by the proof of their impossibility. .... 
This  conviction  of  the  solvability  of  every 
mathematical problem is a powerful incentive to the worker. 
We hear within us the perpetual call: There is the problem. 
Seek  its  solution.  You  can  find  it  by  pure  reason,  for  in 
mathematics there is no ignoramibus. 
 
Even as far back as 1900, in that same famous lecture, Hilbert 
had also stated, clearly and unambiguously, the acceptable criteria for 
the ‘solution of a mathematical problem’ (among which was the validity 
of the tertium non datur):   19 
 
[I]t shall be possible to establish the correctness of the solution 
by  means  of  a  finite  number  of  steps  based  upon  a  finite 
number of hypotheses which are implied in the statement of 
the  problem  and  which  must always  be  exactly  formulated. 
This  requirement  of  logical  deduction  by  means  of  a  finite 
number of processes is simply the requirement of rigour in 
reasoning.” (ibid, p. 409). 
 
These  were  the  methodological  and  epistemological  backdrops 
against which, in Bologna in 1928, Hilbert threw down the gauntlet to 
his foundational detractors, in the clear conviction that the answers to 
the  questions  he  was  posing  would  be  forthcoming—surely,  also,  to 
substantiate his own philosophy of mathematics: 
  Is  mathematics  complete—in  the  sense  that  every 
mathematical  statement  could  be  rigorously—rigour 
interpreted in the above finitary sense—proved or disproved; 
  Is mathematics consistent—in the sense that it should not be 
possible  to  derive,  by  valid  proof  procedures,  again  in  the 
sense of finitary rigorous proof stated above, universally false 
mathematical statements within a formal mathematical system; 
  Is  mathematics  decidable—in  the  sense  of  using  a  definite 
finitary method, it was possible to demonstrate the truth—or 
falsity, as the case may be—of a mathematical assertion. 
 
On  8  September  1930  Hilbert  gave  the  opening  address  to  the 
German  Society  of  Scientists  and  Physicians,  in  Königsberg,  titled: 
Naturkennen  und  Logik.  This  lecture  ended  famously  echoing  those 
feelings  and  beliefs  he  had  expressed  in  Paris,  thirty  years  earlier, 
(Dawson, 1997, p. 71, italics added): 
 
“For the mathematician there is no Ignoramibus and, in my 
opinion, not at all for natural science either. …The true reason 
why [no one] has succeeded in finding an unsolvable problem 
is, in my opinion, 
there  is  no  unsolvable  problem.  In  contrast  to  the  foolish 
Ignoramibus, our credo avers: 
We must know, 
We shall know.”  
   20 
A  day  before  that, on  Sunday,  7th  September,  1930,  at  the 
Roundtable  Discussion  on  the  final  day  of  the  Conference  on 
Epistemology of the Exact Sciences, organised by the Gesellschaft für 
Empirische Philosophie, a Berlin Society allied to the Wiener Kreis, the 
young  Kurt  Gödel  had  presented  what  came  to  be  called  his  First 
Incompleteness Theorem. In fact, in one fell swoop, Gödel had shown 
that  it  was  recursively  demonstrable  that  in  the  formal  system  of 
classical mathematics, assuming it was consistent, there were true but 
unprovable statements—i.e., incompleteness and, almost as a corollary 
to  this  famous  result,  also  that  mathematics  was  inconsistent.  This 
result,  in  its  full  formal  version,  is  known  as  Gödel's  Second 
Incompleteness Theorem: the consistency of a mathematical system 
cannot  be  proved  within  that  system  itself.  Two  of  the pillars  on 
which Hilbert was hoping to justify formalism had been shattered.  
There  remained  the  third:  Decidability.  The  problem  of 
resolving  this  question  depended  on  finding  an  acceptable—to  the 
mathematician, metamathematician and the mathematical philosopher—
definition  of  definite  finitary  method.  In  one  of  the  celebrated 
confluences and simultaneous discoveries that the history of science and 
mathematics seems to be littered with, Alan Turing and Alonzo Church 
came  up  with  definitions  that,  ex  post,  came  to  be  accepted  by 
mathematicians, logicians, etc., as encapsulating the intuitive notion of 
definite finitary method, now routinely referred to as ‘algorithms’.  
Once this was done, the unadulterated genius of Alan Turing 
devised, entirely with the aim of answering the question of decidability 
posed by Hilbert, the now celebrated Turing Machine, (Turing, 1936-7). 
Thus came to an end Hilbert's pyrrhic victory over Brouwer; 
thus  will  come  to  an  end  the  sustained  hostility  to  Bishop's 
constructivism  –  whilst  Veronese  has  already  been  copiously 
vindicated, although many generations after his own lifetime. 
The development of computability theory is, in a strong sense, 
an outgrowth of the Grundlagenkrise. In many ways it stands, as an 
epistemology  and  a  mathematical  philosophy,  midway  between  pure 
Intuitionistic  Constructivism  and  Hilbert's  kind  of  formalism.  For 
example, the tertium non datur is freely invoked in recursion theory. 
Hence it is quite possible to prove the existence of algorithms to solve 
well-posed  mathematical  problems  with  almost  no  hope  of  ever 
constructing  them  for  implementation—or,  at  least,  not  knowing 
whether it can or cannot be done: i.e., undecidable. 
Above  all,  there  is  one  basic  difference  between  recursion 
theory (computability theory) and constructive mathematics (especially   21 
of the Brouwer-Bishop variety): in the former the cardinal disciplining 
precept  is  the  Church-Turing  Thesis;  this  is  not  accepted  in  the 
Brouwer-Bishop variant of constructive mathematics. Why not? I think 
an answer can be found along the lines suggested by Troelstra (1977, 
pp. 3-4): 
 
"Should we accept the intuitionistic form of Church's thesis, 
i.e., the statement 
‘Every lawlike function is recursive’? 
 
There are two reasons for abstaining from the identification 
‘lawlike =recursive’: 
(i) An axiomatic reason: ... [A]ssuming recursiveness means 
carrying  unnecessary  information  around.  In  the  formal 
development, there are many possible interpretations for the 
range of the variables for lawlike sequences .... . 
(ii) A second reason is ‘philosophical’: the (known) informal 
justifications  of  ‘Church's  thesis’  all  go  back  to  Turing's 
conceptual analysis (or proceed along similar lines).  
 
Turing's  analysis  strikes  me  as  providing  very  convincing 
arguments  for  identifying  ‘mechanically  computable’  with 
‘recursive’,  but  as  to  the  identification  of  ‘humanly 
computable‘ with ‘recursive’, extra assumptions are necessary 
which are certainly not obviously implicit in the intuitionistic 
(languageless) approach ... " 
 
The  path  opened  up  by  the  foundational  results  of  Gödel, 
Church,  Turing  and  Post,  made  obsolete  Hilbert's  Program,  without 
completely resolving the ambiguities surrounding ‘Hilbert's Dogma’. I 
suspect,  in  view  of  Gödel's  epistemology  and  his  metamathematical 
results,  we  will  forever  remain  unable  to  resolve  its  status 
unambiguously – also because Brouwer and the Brouwerians, as well as 
non-Intuitionistic  Constructivists  like  Bishop,  refuse  to  compromise 
with logic and language. The extent to which Hilbert was wedded to his 
mathematical ideology can be gauged from the fact that those who were 
close  to  Hilbert  ‘shielded’  him  from  Gödel's  remarkable  results, 
presented at the very meeting where Hilbert had enunciated yet another 
of  his  paeans  to  the  Hilbert  Program  and  to  Hilbert's  Dogma.  He  - 
Hilbert - came to hear of Gödel's Königsberg results 'only months later'   22 
and 'when he learnt about Gödel's work, he was angry' (van Dalen, 2005, 
p. 638). 
 
In an even greater twist of fate—or what may felicitously be 
referred  to  as  a  noble  unintended  consequence  of  dogma—Veronese 
was resurrected (implicitly) by an invoking of Gödel's incompleteness 
results: 
 
"For a long time the incompleteness of axiomatic systems was 
regarded by mathematicians as unfortunate. It was the genius 
of Abraham Robinson, in the early sixties, to turn it to good 
use  and  show  that  thanks  to  it  a  vast  simplification  of 
mathematical reasoning can be achieved." 
Nelson, 1987, p. 15 
 
The icing on this twisted cake was the award of the second 
Brouwer Medal, in March, 1973, to Abraham Robinson, on the occasion 
of which he paid handsome tribute to Browuer, Intuitionism and the key 
difference between invention and discovery in mathematics, (Dauben, 
1995, p. 461): 
 
"Brouwer's intuitionism is closely related to his conception of 
mathematics  as  a  dynamic  activity  of  the  human  intellect 
rather than the discovery of an immutable abstract universe. 
This  is  a  conception  for  which  I  have  some  sympathy  and 
which, I believe, is acceptable to many mathematicians who 
are not intuitionists." 
 
I would like to end this section with a counterfactual thought: 
suppose  Hilbert  had  not  ‘thrown  down  the  gauntlet’  and  challenged 
mathematicians and mathematical philosophers to resolve, by finitary 
means,  the  triptych  of  completeness,  consistency  and  decidability, 
would the genius of a Gödel, the innocent brilliance of a Turing, or the 
deep speculations of a Church have concentrated on the extraordinary 
work that led to the emergence of recursion theory? Connoisseurs of the 
foundations of mathematics may, of course, be able to say that Post's 
work in his doctoral dissertation (Post, 1921) and Skolem (1923) would, 
in  good  time,  have  been  (re-)discovered  and  the  mathematical 
foundations of computer science, not to mention the epistemology of 
metamathematics,  could  have  been  erected  on  similar  foundations. 
Others, like myself, like to think that a recursion theory more finessed   23 
and  attuned  to  the  strictures  of  constructive  mathematics  may  have 
become  the  foundations  of  computer  science  and  metamathematics. 
Either  way,  eventually,  Hilbert's  victory—at  least  in  some  senses—
proved to be, and would have proven to be, pyrrhic. 
 
Harvesting Some Lessons 
 
"The possibility of the impossible, dreams and illusions, are 




In  economics  we  expect  self  appointed  Commissars  of  varieties  of 
ideologies to act as gate keepers, censoring or approving access to the 
gates of plenty, at the expense of visions and freedom of thought. It is 
not  seldom  we  hear  the  phrase  self-censorship  in  departments  of 
economics  aspiring  to  climb  the  rungs  of  official  reputation,  as 
measured  by  counters  of  orthodox  bibliometric  criteria.  Graduate 
students are nurtured, implicitly and explicitly, on the nature of research 
that  would  mean  anything  for  promotion,  funding  and  research 
facilities. 
That such a state of affairs has persisted in the purest recesses 
of mathematics—at its deepest levels of foundational research—came 
as a complete surprise to me. I embarked on trying to understand the 
status of proof in mathematical economics and the role of computation 
in  applied  economics  and  emerged  with  perplexities  beyond 
explicabilities,  initially.  But  with  hindsight,  and  reflections  on  a 
particular  episode  in  economic  theory,  it  became  possible  for  me  to 
interpret the events I have tried to describe, however briefly, above. 
 Piero Sraffa's elegant, terse,  Production of Commodities by 
Means of  Commodities, (Sraffa, 1960; henceforth, PCC), has reached 
the status of a classic: viz, often quoted, rarely read.  From a purely 
mathematical point of view, PCC lacks nothing. The concerns in PCC 
are  the  solvability  of  equation  systems,  and,  whenever  existence  or 
uniqueness  proofs  are  considered,  they  are  either  spelled  out  in 
completeness, albeit from a non-formal, non-classical, point of view or 
detailed hints are given, usually in the form of examples, to complete 
the necessary proofs in required generalities. Standard economic theory, 
on the other hand, is naturally formalized in terms of inequalities. A 
case can even be made that this is so that fix-point theorems can easily   24 
be applied to prove the existence of equilibria. A case made elegantly 
by Steve Smale:  
 
"I think it is fair to say that for the main existence problems in 
the theory of economic equilibrium, one can now bypass the 
fixed point approach and attack the equations directly to give 
existence of solutions, with a simpler kind of mathematics and 
even mathematics with dynamic and algorithmic overtones." 
Smale, 1976, p.290; italics added. 
 
Sraffa,  in  PCC,  ‘bypassed  the  fixed  point  approach  and 
attacked the equations directly to give existence of solutions, with a 
simpler  kind  of  mathematics’,  one  with  ‘algorithmic  overtones’  - 
essentially  by  relying  on  ‘existence  as  construction’,  rather  than 
appealing to Hilbert's Dogma. 
For over thirty years I have been making the case for proving 
one  of  these  famous  theorems  on  non-negative  square  matrices—in 
particular  the  Perron-Frobenius  theorems—using  the  constructive 
framework Sraffa has provided, rather than the other way about. There 
are gradual stirrings and hints that some devotees of Sraffian economics 
may have begin to think along these lines, although they are—so far as I 
have  been  able  to  gauge—entirely  unversed  in  serious  constructive 
analysis (or even computable analysis).  
Instead of reading Sraffa's book directly, most mathematically 
minded economists read it with a background in classical mathematical 
economics. In a repetition of the fate that befell Bishop and his students, 
at  the hands of journal referees who were unable to see beyond the 
methods  of  classical  mathematical  economics,  Sraffa's  book,  and  its 
mathematics, was condemned to mathematical oblivion simply because 
familiar  notation,  orthodox  mathematical  tools  and  standard  proof 
techniques  were  not  harnessed  by  him,  in  deriving  his  impeccably 
rigorous results. 
The same drama played out in the foundations of mathematics, 
epoch  after  epoch,  was  repeated  in  the  purest  parts  of  economic 
theory—but to that tale was added an ideological twist, at least in my 
opinion. By declaring that Sraffa's mathematical method was less than 
rigorous—because it did not invoke ‘classical’ mathematical results to 
‘prove’ the theorems in PCC—and, moreover, that it was only a special 
case  of  the  framework  developed  by  von  Neumann  (1938),  the 
important  economic message in the book was effectively subverted. 
Similar to the way the classically trained mathematician, refereeing the   25 
works by Bishop and his students, could not understand the point of ‘re-
proving’  classically  derived  results,  the  less  than  competent 
mathematical economist reduced PCC to a special case of this or that 
version of some orthodox version of economic theory. 
This kind of insidious thought censorship, by self appointed 
Commissars  of  correct  thinking,  plague  not  only  the  foundations  of 
mathematics.  They  are  alive  and  well  in  economics—and  I  guess  in 
every domain of the pure sciences and in the theoretical recesses of 
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